Trouble in Camp Air Force: Culture, Justice, and Sexual Assault

The Air Force is struggling to contend with an epidemic of sexual assault.  Public credibility and mission focus are at stake. When it comes to this issue, two things matter: the prosecution of criminals, and a team culture marked by trust and respect.  These are the keys to response and prevention. To recover its credibility and refocus on its mission, the Air Force will need to get back to these basics.

jeffrey-krusinski

Lt Col Jeff Krusinski
Credit: NPR

Two months ago, the Air Force turned over management of its sexual assault prevention and response program to a Lieutenant Colonel whose screening for the job, according to the Air Force Chief of Staff, consisted of the judgment that he had a “very good” performance record.  A few days ago, he allegedly confounded that record, and the solemn duty attendant to his recent appointment, by himself sexually battering a woman in a late-night incident in the parking lot of a strip club.  In a drunken imbroglio that ended with a mug shot reminiscent of a Nick Nolte arrest, this once rising officer swiftly turned Cinco de Mayo into “career buh-bye-o” … leaving in his wake a victim of the very crime he was hired to prevent and dismaying a service full of colleagues forced to suffer the shame his actions will assuredly visit upon them.  They collectively shake their heads, taking solace only in the fact that he seems to have failed as an aspiring criminal and gotten his ass kicked in the process.

Welsh AmusedIs this just an(other) isolated instance of facepalm-worthy Air Force sexualWelsh Amused misconduct, or should it be taken as one more flashing red indicator of a sweeping and strategically significant problem?  These were the themes weighed by lawmakers as they grilled General Mark Welsh just two days after the incident.  Despite his assurances that the service is serious about the problem and trying every possible means of addressing it, Senators Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), speaking on behalf of not only themselves but of advocacy groups, concerned citizens, and exasperated service members, are beginning to connect the dots of this issue rather than viewing events in isolation.  The resulting picture is damning and damnable for a service that has not only failed to effectively address sexual assault, but by some indications seems to have created a peculiar breeding ground for it.

Welsh Amused

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The Silver Lining: Turning Resource Turbulence Into Smart Air Force Reform

“We’ve got no money, so we’ve got to think.”
– Ernest Rutherford

After months of hand-wringing, feverish planning, and paralyzing uncertainty, the Air Force this week began registering some of the sharpest consequences of budget sequestration.  The service announced on April 9th the grounding of one-third of its fighter fleet through the end of the fiscal year, a measure designed to save more than $500 million in flying hour costs.  On the heels of this dour news came the rollout of President Obama’s 2014 budget, which includes a reduction in service end-strength by 2,640 airmen.  These reductions are hitting home against the backdrop of a punishing operational tempo and frequent deployments, realities underscored by the recent loss of an F-16 and its pilot during a combat patrol in Afghanistan.  Despite the fact that a war continues to rage half a world away, it’s clear that Air Force, along with its sister services, is entering a time of severe resource turbulence.

But in this challenge, there is tremendous opportunity.  The service has spent the past decade struggling to adapt by championing, promoting, honing, and investing in capabilities that many do not believe comprise the core of its future mission, and has been battered by 22 years of standing continuously on war footing.  The pressure and persistent tempo of this period have not permitted the service a chance for a bottom-up review of itself, and signs of wear, bureaucratic calcification, policy drift, and internal conflict have become more prominent.  With sequestration, the nascent preference for reduced federal spending, and the clear trend toward foreign policy retrenchment, there is now a moment when ideas that might otherwise have engendered too much resistance to succeed have an increased chance of taking root.  Minds are more open to change and sacred cows are walking more nervously.  If the institution can muster the collective will to answer to its longstanding preference for aggressive action to “lead turn” its future, it can seize on important reform initiatives that can save money, encourage a culture of conservation that will posture it well for the future, and address a number of stubborn challenges to morale in the process.

Despite being a brilliant institution led and membered overwhelmingly by superior men and women, the Air Force is not immune to the wasteful practices that tend to develop in large, top-heavy bureaucracies.  There are non-value-added activities and wasteful management practices taking place within today’s Air Force; ferreting them out could produce considerable savings that could be re-directed toward sustaining the service’s core competencies and interests through a period of severely constrained spending.  The following ideas are not intended to be all-inclusive, but could provide a partial roadmap to reformers looking for ways to save money while pulling the service into tighter formation.

1. Take a Close Look at Airlift.  Even as the service stands It's going to be a good flightdown fighter squadrons, the airlift community is as busy as ever.  Some of the missions being tasked do not seem necessary.  Crews are sometimes tasked to fly from a cargo staging base to the AOR with only 1/3 or 1/2 of their cargo capacity utilized, for example.  Crews sometimes arrive at a forward base only to have the supposedly desperate recipient of a cargo load appear puzzled as to what is being delivered and why; in fact, cargo reception teams sometimes appear surprised by the very arrival of an airlift mission. This raises obvious questions about mission necessity.  Occasionally, a crew will operate a mission to deliver cargo downrange only to be sent back to retrieve the same cargo in the next day or two.  While aircraft commanders often push back against mission plans that seem dubious, they are nearly always ordered by the Tanker Airlift Control Center to push forward and execute.  Underlying factors impacting mission necessity are not made visible to executing aircrews, obscuring information they might employ in making smarter risk management decisions.  Much of this problem is explained by the lack of a solid cargo visibility system like you’d find at Fedex or UPS.  The absence of such a system gives inefficiency a free hand, degrading the chance for a culture of conservation to develop; aircrews bearing witness to frequent waste have trouble taking seriously the message of conservation persistently relayed by their chain of command.  Some in Air Mobility Command (AMC) have suggested giving aircraft commanders authority to initially refuse missions that under-utilize cargo capacity and are not servicing Troops-In-Contact.  This idea has not gotten a serious audience with senior leaders, but it’s worthy of discussion.  A few simple guidelines, some healthy empowerment, and more decentralized execution could save resources and force the supply chain management process to improve, creating new systemic efficiency critical to the future cost-sustainability of the airlift mission. Those who would resist empowering aircraft commanders are owed a reminder that these are mid-level officers with command authority who might be entrusted with the lives of hundreds of soldiers in another service; they are worthy of greater trust and authority … and they have a strong vantage point to evaluate whether a mission is necessary enough to be a responsible use of resources.

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Air Force, Listen to Your Gut and Stop the Waist

Husky

(Note: this piece originally cited Colonel Tim Bush’s height as 6’4″.  This was based on an inaccurate report.  According to a Grand Forks Herald article that appears authoritative, he is actually 6’1″.  Text in the piece has been updated to reflect.)

The Air Force recently fired a senior officer with an elite, 25-year performance record, cashiering him from command of a key Air Force wing several months short of a full tour.  His firing is not insignificant.  The 319th Air Base Wing is the parent organization for more than 1,100 combat-ready airmen in dozens of disciplines belonging to nine squadrons and nine geographically separated units.  These airmen and squadrons were given an interim commander and will now adapt in extremis to a new boss yet to be named, enduring significant organizational turbulence in the process, all while weathering the twin pressures of sequestration and an unprecedented operational tempo.

Colonel Tim Bush

Colonel Tim Bush

This didn’t happen because Colonel Tim Bush had been immoral, toxic, or made bad decisions.  In fact, Air Mobility Command was quick to point out that his firing was not “for alleged misconduct or wrongdoing.”  So, what offense was severe enough to warrant a firing but minor enough not to involve wrongdoing? According the Air Force statement, Bush’s relief stemmed from his “failure to comply with physical fitness standards.”  What it doesn’t make explicit is that Bush was actually quite fit, passing the pushup, situp, and running portion of his physical fitness test. But he was still deemed unfit because his abdominal circumference was two inches larger than authorized.

This superstar officer, Bronze Star recipient, respected veteran commander, and regaled combat pilot, who by all accounts behaved honorably and performed impeccably, was jettisoned from a position of special trust — a position to which he’d been approved for appointment by the senior officer of the Air Force — because at 6’1” tall, he was unable maintain a waist circumference of less than or equal to 39 inches.

And on Planet Bizzarro, the news was no-doubt greeted with thunderous applause. Here on Earth, one has to wonder if this is some sort of experiment with dark humor.    According to a recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the average waist size for a male American of Bush’s age, irrespective of height, is 41 inches.  So it seems the man was fired for being an accurate physical reflection of the society he serves.

What makes this so eyebrow-raising is that wing commanders have been known to survive wrecked airplanes, failed inspections, operational failures of various sorts, unfavorable climate assessments, rashes of disciplinary issues, and even outbreaks of criminal activity within their organizations.  In a way, this makes sense.  When someone is given command of a wing, they by definition place among the very most talented, developed, and upwardly-mobile officers of the service, and it therefore stands to reason that things that happen within their sizeable realms should be considered in context, with the service reserving relief for those situations where leadership failure is clearly manifest.  Apparently, in today’s Air Force, being a larger than average person qualifies as such a failure, even if crashing an airplane or failing an inspection doesn’t.

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Fly, Fight, and Wean: Reforming Air Force Officer Tuition Assistance

Lakenheath Mud PigThe recent decision by the Air Force to discontinue Tuition Assistance (TA) funding under heavy budget pressure drew equally heavy criticism from many.  This is unsurprising given the short notice and hurried nature of an announcement that impacted the education plans of an estimated 73,000 airmen.  Even with Congress ordering the service on March 21st to reinstate the program, key decisions loom concerning how it will be implemented in the future, sending ripples of uncertainty through communities responsible for recruitment, retention, and development policy.

The Air Force’s initial statements concerning the future of TA show an intent to scale back the level of benefit provided to each individual, a reasonable and arguably necessary adjustment considering the program has exceeded its budget for the past ten years, according to a recent statement by the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.  But given the severity of the current budget shortfall and the inevitability of additional pressure in the near future, this simplistic approach may not be enough to make the program sustainable into the future.  It would also bypass an important opportunity to reform officer voluntary education and potentially free up millions of dollars for use by enlisted airmen who might otherwise be frozen out by future shortfalls.  Making the most of this opportunity requires weaning the officer corps from a peculiar development culture that has grown entrenched over time, largely as a result of the assumption of perpetually unlimited TA funding.  With that assumption now invalidated, the moment is right for substantive reform, but it will require more than a single-aspect, linear solution.  That’s because the problem is complicated.

Continuing education has been a thorny issue within the Air Force officer corps for years.  While individual officers cherish the availability of funded coursework as a means of self-improvement, many have grown to resent what is half-jokingly referred to as “forced development” and questioned just how “voluntary” their use of TA can be when failure to utilize it typically produces career jeopardy.  While the Air Force has not established a formal requirement for an Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) for officer promotion (aside from a select few specialties), review and advancement board processes are structured in ways that make the failure to complete an AAD a negative discriminator.  This has created a de facto requirement to complete a graduate degree for retention and promotion beyond the rank of Captain, making self-development often a product of systemic coercion rather than intrinsic motivation.

Frustrating to officers and commanders alike is the unwritten nature of the requirement, which generates confusion for individuals and leaves commanders on unsure footing when mentoring and advising subordinates.  Rather than an explicit requirement for an AAD by a specified career milepost — which would create two-way commitment and a predicate for resources — the service has opted to let market forces steer organizational behavior.  By providing full tuition coverage under a large annual cap and allowing degree completion to appear in an officer’s record — where it is visible to promotion and screening boards — the Air Force has structured incentives strongly in favor pursuing an AAD.  This has driven officers who have the time, inclination, and access to desired academic programs to energetically pursue degrees, with completion giving them a large competitive advantage over peers for promotion and retention. This has in turn forced those without the time, inclination, or access to do the same in order to remain competitive.  This leaves many trying to wedge degree work into a full calendar, pursuing a degree they really don’t want, or settling for the pursuit of what is available … because they’ve determined that not doing so is a high-stakes gamble that could end in career catastrophe.  This competitive spiral has tightened as board processes that thrive on easy discriminators to help them differentiate between officers with largely analogous performance records have come to rely more and more on AAD completion as a heavily weighted criterion.  Between 2004 and 2009, 718 of 956 officers non-selected for promotion to Major (75.1%) did not possess an AAD.  Over that same period, officers with an AAD stood a 96.1% chance of being promoted by those same boards.

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Facts and Facepalms: Learning from the Iraq War

MAJFK once famously remarked “there’s always some poor son of a bitch who doesn’t get the word.”  He was observing the fact that in any situation of appreciable magnitude, there’s always someone who misses the relay of key information and continues on the previous course, oblivious.  As the nation reflected solemnly Tuesday on the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, it became evident — to my tortured amusement — that there are still people who haven’t gotten the word that the war in Iraq was a fantastically bad idea.  Like Japanese soldiers abandoned on a Pacific Island who believe WWII is still raging, they carry on, undisturbed by reality.  For many, self-imprisonment in this cage of fictions probably started on May 1st, 2003, with George W. Bush’s triumphant speech under the Mission Accomplished banner. It was the inauguration of an ongoing effort by many to convince everyone, including themselves, that the decision, execution, and aftermath of Iraq were good and virtuous for all involved. But while fiction always gets a one-mile head start on the truth … the facts eventually catch up. Fact is, Private First Class Jesse Givens died in Iraq the same day President Bush declared the war over.  Fact is, another 4,282 Americans would die in Iraq after victory was declared.

Fact is, it was a bad decision based on flawed and ultimately baseless rationale.  It generated horrific outcomes for virtually all involved at every level.  The fiction of Iraq will live on in the minds and words of its adherents.  The fact of it must prevail in our national conversation.  Only by embracing our failure can we protect future generations against repeating our mistakes.

Those who continue to champion the Iraq War start by insisting Iraq itself is better off as a consequence of having been invaded and occupied.  Better off because of the estimated 116,000 Iraqis who were caught in the crossfire and lost their lives.  Better off with the constantly looming threat of civil war, fueled by the invasion’s instant uncorking of centuries of pent-up religious, ethnic, and clan divisions.  Better off with the loss of public utilities, destruction of key infrastructure, and disruption of civic processes.  Better off because of the 7 million Iraqi people living below the poverty line and unable to get proper health care in a broken medical system saturated by constant violence.  Better off having been psychologically conditioned by years of night raids and occasionally errant munitions that have made PTSD a mutli-generational assumption for rank-and-file Iraqi families.  Better off with 3.5 million people displaced from their homes.  Of course, apologists will explain these consequences as the collective price of Iraqi Freedom.  They flourish rhetorically, invoking high-minded notions of liberty, progress, and the long view.  But these ideals are lost on the dead, homeless, downtrodden, displaced, and traumatized.  Fact is, they don’t see these consequences as the price of their freedom, but as the price exacted by the US-led coalition for the service of removing Saddam Hussein.

But apologists for the war don’t stop at Iraq’s borders; they want us to believe the entire region is better off because of what we did.  This is a difficult claim to sustain given that Iran is more active in the region than before, that it is threatening to develop a nuclear weapon, that Syria is unraveling, that Libya and Egypt are on uncertain trajectories, and the region is far less stable overall than before.  Some are now claiming that these consequences are completely isolated from the US occupation of Iraq, that it had no role in generating, catalyzing, or influencing anything negative or unstable, and that the absence of Saddam Hussein from the region means that it is better off by definition.  This is not plausible reasoning.

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They Fought It, We Bought It

Two_Dollar_Battle_Tank_by_orudorumagi11Most important decisions can be boiled down to two options, and ordinarily one option stands out as more difficult than the other.  Usually, the more difficult choice represents the correct path, while the easier decision offers expediency. As pressure mounts on the US defense budget, policy makers and those influencing them face a decision that is increasingly understandable according to two options.  Reducing the cost of national defense will be achieved either by pursuing structural reform, reducing wasteful practices, and discontinuing unnecessary expenditures — the correct path — or by taking a budgetary axe to military pay and benefits — the expedient but wrong decision.  There is a mounting risk that key stakeholders could make short-term inputs leading to the long-term ruin of the world’s most important professional military.

At the national level, expedient decisions are made palatable through the construction of a political narrative designed to make them appear necessary.  Such a narrative has been building around the concept of reducing military benefits for a few years now.  DoD’s most recent quadrennial pay study advanced the proposition that military members were better paid than their civilian counterparts.  A 2011 Defense Business Board proposal called for a sweeping overhaul of the current retirement system, pointing to a $3.85T bill by the year 2034.  The motivations behind these analyses are not so much unpatriotic as they are pragmatic.  Defense leaders are beset with huge challenges inherited from their predecessors and are driven to preserve resources for training and equipment modernization. As competition for scarce funds intensifies, many see these motives colliding with the expense of compensating personnel.  With the nation now focused on a budget crisis, some are warming to the oversimplified narrative of an overpaid military and cultivating a discussion that risks lending undeserved legitimacy to such a view.  That this discussion is even considered fair game at one of the most difficult moments in American military history is shocking to many.  It begs for context.

The nature of service in today’s US military is historically unprecedented.  Since 9/11/01, servicemembers have been ordered to deploy more often, for longer durations, and under more intense conditions than in any other period. More than 2.5 million military members have deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, with more than 800,000 serving multiple deployments.  A stunning 400,000 have gone back to warzones at least three times, and around 37,000 have deployed more than five times.  Despite considerable research demonstrating the inordinate strain of long deployment, and as if having learned nothing from the experience of Vietnam beyond how to maximize abuse of a labor force at a level just shy of catalyzing mutiny or public outrage, an Army ill-prepared for two simultaneous counterinsurgencies had little choice but to send its soldiers to war for 12 months at a time, a practice established during the draft era and founded on the assumption of each soldier deploying only once.  The strain was aggravated further by the inability to give deployers anything resembling a constructive rest cycle, leading to many spending more time in combat than resting between engagements.  The Iraq “surge” led to an extended deployment of 15 months  for more than 100,000, a crushing blow to morale and an open admission by DoD of the need to resort to abusive practices to make up for the hubris of the war’s architects, who dismissed the advice of the Army Chief of Staff in designing a woefully understaffed operation.

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The Luxury of Being Wrong

74015-nicholsonDavid Wood enjoys something most members of the US military do not.  He has the luxury of performing poorly in his job and living to tell about it.

Mr. Wood published a Huffington Post article earlier this year originally titled “After a Decade of Lavish Benefits, Military Personnel Fear Cuts.”  This lamentable array of words, a cheap literary hook designed to ensnare fiscally paranoid readers by construing military members as trough-feeding elites defensively crouched over burgeoning piles of cash, was inexplicably changed Tuesday.  But not before Mr. Wood managed to rack up nearly 40,000 votes of approval on Facebook.  And not before he managed to cultivate an ugly and undeserved myth that can only harm the soul of a nation: the myth that America’s fighting men and women are some sort of high-on-the-hog mercenary force.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

Mr. Wood, though you’re likely to never read these words, let me address you directly as a veteran. I understand that you’re against war in general.  I understand you were against the invasion of Iraq. It might surprise you just how many veterans agree with you on these matters.  But sir, despite your admirable credentials and even given the benefit of the doubt, you’ve managed to pen an article so careless with the image of the American veteran that it should not have seen the light of day.  I assume without meaning to do so, you’ve insulted the quiet, unassuming ethic of the American veteran by saying things that beg to be challenged, thereby inviting your subjects to defend themselves against your words, which they do at the risk of appearing prideful, something almost universally abhorred in the veteran culture.

So I appeal to you, Mr. Wood.  Before you pick up your pen again, take care in your thoughts and how you express them.  Take care that you don’t express manifestly incorrect notions that your readership, trusting your Pulitzer credentials and your evident sensibility, might wrongly share, forward, and ultimately, legitimize.

To say that military pay and benefits have “soared far above civilian comparison” is either misguided or disingenuous, but in either case, deeply wrong.  To the extent military pay and benefits have been kept competitive, this has been necessary to keep enough qualified warriors in uniform to get the job done.  If anything, the use of pay has been a cynical instrument employed to prevent mass abandonment of an activity bent on grinding people and their families into a fine powder.  The level of sacrifice asked of our military in recent years is historically unprecedented, and America’s warriors are not getting rich enduring it.  In fact, 1.5 million of them need food stamps to supplement their incomes, scores have trouble finding post-service employment, and tens of thousands will live the rest of their lives without ever being made whole again, having left things on the battlefield that defy monetary valuation. Military members make their decisions concerning whether or not to stay in uniform on the basis of many criteria, pay and benefits among these. Each family has its own situation and hence its own calculus. C’est la guerre.  But until machine press operators and gas station attendants start spending 12 months away from their families and living constantly under the threat of getting blown apart by an IED, you and your readers should consider any comparison of military and civilian pay fundamentally invalid.

But just out of curiosity … who exactly do you think is overpaid?  Generalities are fun, but whose “lavish” pay should be slashed?  The 20-year-old Ohioan struggling to understand Pashto while he orchestrates installation of a water filtration system in a village that has resisted improvement since before Alexander the Great?  Maybe the 32-year-old Californian responsible for guiding a 50,000-pound aircraft moving at the speed of sound to a precise point in time and space where she will deliver a Volkswagen-sized munition to a point on the Earth no bigger than a hopscotch court … knowing she will kill her own teammates or allow the enemy to kill them if she gets it wrong?  Or maybe the 40-year-old Floridian whose success is defined by whether his ability to train, motivate, inspire, and focus the 500 people in his charge will be enough to keep them alive in a war where neither the enemy nor the objective are understood and the source of the next attack is never known?  You’re not talking about “personnel” my friend … you’re talking about “people.”  Individuals with talents, capabilities, and courage that scare the living hell out of enemies.  They are a bargain at twice the current rate, fiscal pressures be damned.

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